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Abstract
We provide a direct test of the impact of altruism on remittances. From a sample
of 105 male migrant workers from Kerala, India working in Qatar, we elicit the
propensity to share with others from their responses in a dictator game, and use
it as a proxy for altruism. When the entire sample is considered, we find that
only migrants’ income robustly explains remittances. Altruism does not seem to
matter. However, we document a strong positive relationship between altruism and
remittances for those migrants that report a loan obligation back home, which is
nearly half the sample. We explain the role of loan obligations with a standard
remittance model, extended with reference-dependent preferences.
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1. Introduction
Monetary remittances by migrants constitute a behavior of significant eco-
nomic importance. In 2012, cross-national remittances to developing countries
were estimated to be over $400 billion, with almost $70 billion in remittances to
India alone. In Tajikistan, Lesotho, Moldova, Samoa, the Kyrgyz Republic, Nepal,
Tonga, and Lebanon, remittances currently account for a proportion of between
20% and 47% of GDP.1 Economic studies report a strong impact of remittances
on economic growth, business cycles, and the financial development of remittance-
receiving countries.2
However, despite their economic impact, the motives driving remittances are
not well understood. Among the plausible motives, altruism is one of the most
prominent (see Stark (1995); Rapoport and Docquier (2006); Carling (2008)).
Yet, altruism is difficult to measure directly. Therefore, to determine the impor-
tance of altruism as a motive for remittances, economists have traditionally relied
on indirect tests. For example, in their seminal paper, Lucas and Stark (1985)
propose a common test to discriminate between two alternative models of remit-
tances based on different motives: a model based on altruism and another based
on self-interest. Both models predict that remittances increase with the migrant’s
income, but only in the altruistic model do remittances decline as the recipient
household’s income rises. Therefore, to assess whether altruism is a relevant mo-
tive, they propose to test whether remittances decrease in the household’s income.3
1Source: ”Migration and Development Brief, No. 20” The World Bank, April 19, 2013.
2For recent evidence, see Agarwal et al. (2011); Mandelman and Zlate (2012); Guiliano
and Ruiz-Arranz (2009); Bettin et al. (2012); for a review, see Yang (2011); Rapoport and
Docquier (2006).
3Also see Agarwal and Horowitz (2002); Bouhga-Hagbe (2006); Osili (2007); Melkonyan
and Grigorian (2012) for other discussion of the altruistic motive in remittance behavior.
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Such indirect tests, however, face three limitations. First, alternative models
of remittances may also predict that the amount remitted is negatively corre-
lated with the recipient household’s income. For example, Stark (1995, Ch. 4)
presents a strategic motive for remittances and migration, which also predicts
a negative relationship between remittances and household income.4 Second, a
non-negative relationship between remittances and the household’s income cannot
rule out the altruistic motive if past remittances, driven by altruism, substantially
raised present household income (Lucas and Stark (1985)). Third, even if a nega-
tive correlation between remittances and household income supports the altruistic
motive over alternative ones as a reason for remittances, we still cannot assess
the direct importance of altruism as a motive rather than one of possibly many
causal factors. That is, at best we learn of the direction of the relationship, but
not necessarily of the magnitude or importance.
To address these limitations in current methods, our study provides, to the best
of our knowledge, the first direct test of the impact of altruism on remittances.
To do so, we administered a survey and conducted a behavioral experiment using
105 male migrant workers from Kerala, India working in Qatar.5 The behavioral
experiment consisted of tasks measuring social preferences, including a dictator
game, in which each participant received 100 Qatari Riyals (approximately, US
$27) and decided how much of that amount to give to another, anonymous indi-
vidual. From their responses, we elicit the propensity to share with others and use
4Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and Cox and Fafchamps (2007) provide further examples.
5While our sample is smaller than that in many other studies of migrant remittance behavior
(see, e.g., Lucas and Stark (1985); Funkhouser (1995); Agarwal and Horowitz (2002), but
also see Osili (2007) that uses sample size similar to ours), our design employs behavioral tasks
which take time to administer and for which subjects are paid. This necessarily limits our feasible
sample size to one comparable to those used in laboratory experiments.
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it to proxy for each participant’s degree of altruism.6
On many dimensions, the migrants in our sample form a homogeneous group.
They are all male, married workers from the same state in India, who have either
partially or fully completed secondary education, and are of a similar age. In
addition, the characteristics of their households in India are also homogeneous.
A vast majority of migrants (84%) report that there is no other income in the
household in India, which typically has 3 to 4 members and a home of a comparable
quality.
Yet, these seemingly identical migrants differ in one very important dimension
that will play a significant role in our analysis. About half of them report having
an explicit loan obligation back home. These loan obligations are economically
significant – for example, related to the acquisition of a family home. Nonethe-
less, migrants who do and do not have loan obligations tend to be very similar
with respect to their socioeconomic background and their reported priorities for
remittances, which are typically home related.
Our main objective is to investigate whether the measured variation in altru-
ism across migrants helps to explain the observed variation in remittance behavior.
In contrast to the common perception, for the entire sample we find no relation-
ship between altruism and remittances. This finding, nevertheless, accords with
the complex interdependence of various factors and motives for remittances that,
unless accounted for, can annihilate the effect of the altruistic motive (for a gen-
eral discussion, see Stark (1995); Rapoport and Docquier (2006); Yang (2011)).
In this study, we uncover one such confounding factor—the possession of a loan
6This measure of altruism is widely employed in the behavioral economics literature (e.g.
Forsythe et al. (1994); Camerer (2003)). We also employed other behavioral tasks – public
good, investment, and ultimatum games – which measure more complex social preferences, such
as reciprocity.
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obligation. We find that remittances rise with the degree of altruism only for the
migrants with a loan obligation. Specifically, the estimated remittance schedule
has a smaller intercept and a larger coefficient of altruism for the migrants with a
loan obligation than for those without. As a result, we observe that at a low degree
of altruism, migrants with a loan obligation remit less than those without, and vice
versa. Finally, among other variables considered, only migrants’ income robustly
explains remittances: For every dollar earned, migrants remit, on average, about
sixty cents.
We argue that our empirical findings related to the possession of loan obliga-
tions are in line with the traditional model of the altruistic motive (Lucas and
Stark (1985); Stark (1995, Ch. 4)) extended with reference-dependent prefer-
ences. In particular, we characterize a migrant’s utility from remittance with a
gain-loss function as in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). The reference point can be
thought as the amount of money that the migrant is expected to send home, as de-
termined by existing obligations, family needs, or social comparisons. We discuss
the salience of reference dependence for remitting behavior later in the text. We
assume loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)): A migrant experiences a
positive utility if his remittance is above the reference point and a negative utility
if below, with losses looming larger than gains.
If migrants without a loan obligation face more uncertainty about the refer-
ence point for remittances, an assumption that we justify later in the text, we show
that the theoretical predictions of the model closely match our empirical results.
At low levels of remittance, an increase in uncertainty about the reference point
prompts loss-averse migrants to remit more in order to avoid the risk and resul-
tant disutility of falling short of the expectations. At high levels of remittance,
this risk is negligible and, with the diminishing utility of remittances above the
reference point, the relationship between remittances and increasing uncertainty
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turns negative as migrants prefer more private consumption. Thus, the model
predicts a flatter remittance schedule in altruism for migrants without loan obli-
gations in accordance with our empirical results. From a different perspective,
the altruistic motive can be diminished by loss aversion coupled with uncertainty
about remittance expectations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe
the data and compare the characteristics of migrants that report an explicit loan
obligation to those that report none. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis.
In Section 4, we discuss reference dependence and offer an interpretation of our
results. The last section concludes the study.
2. Data
Our data come from two sources. First, data on migrants’ personal and house-
hold characteristics, their remittances, savings, consumption, and loans were col-
lected through an extensive survey administered between May and June 2012
among migrant workers in Doha, Qatar. To limit heterogeneity, we considered
only married migrant blue-collar workers from Kerala, India whose spouses re-
mained behind, and a vast majority of whom had at most a high-school degree. A
total of 204 surveys from across seven labor camps were completed.
Our second source of data comes from behavioral experiments we conducted
with a subset of the migrant workers who had completed the survey. Specifically,
a few weeks after the surveys were completed, we invited all migrants who took
the survey to come to the campus of the Georgetown University in Doha and
participate in a series of behavioral games. Transportation was provided. A total
of 105 migrants accepted the invitation.7
7Although we invited the migrant workers to come to campus on a weekend, some of them
had to go to work, which explains the attrition.
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At the session, migrants played the public good, trust, dictator, and ultimatum
games. For the present study, which focuses on altruism, we only consider behavior
in the dictator game. In this game, the participants were randomly matched
in pairs, but the identity of the paired participant was never revealed. Each
participant was then asked to decide how much of a 100 Qatari Riyal endowment
(approximately US $27, the equivalent of about two-days worth of the average
migrant’s salary) he would share with his anonymous partner.8 The mean and
median transfers made in the dictator game were 37% and 40% of the endowment,
respectively.9
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 105 migrants. By
design, there is no variation in gender, place of origin, and marital status, and
little variation in education. Some variation exists in migrants’ salary, age, years
in Qatar, expected time remaining until return to India, household income, and
household size. In addition, 44% of the migrants report an explicit loan obligation
back home, while 56% report none.
Loans
One of the findings of this study is that loan obligations can potentially affect
remittance behavior. Therefore, before we present the empirical analysis we pro-
vide a short description of the loans and a comparison between the migrants in
our sample with an explicit loan obligation and those without.
In our sample, 46 migrants (44%) report having a loan obligation back home.
8The English translation of the instructions of the dictator game from Malayalam is available
upon request. Along with written instructions, in their own language, the participants were
also shown voiced PowerPoint presentations about the games played. Additionally, there were
Malayalam-speaking assistants trained to help participants in better understanding the games.
9These numbers fall within the range of mean and median offers observed in similar studies,
which is between 10% and 50% (see Camerer (2003, Table 2.4, pp 57–58)).
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Based on (i) migrants’ personal characteristics, (ii) household characteristics, (iii)
information on their residence, and (iv) information on other assets in the posses-
sion of the household, we observe that these migrants are essentially indistinguish-
able from the migrants who do not report any loan obligations (see Table 2). In
all but one variable (”own telephone”) the difference between the migrants with
loans and those without is statistically insignificant at the p < 0.05 level (see the
last column of Table 2). Both types of migrants, on average, earn between $6,000
to $7,000 per year, remit around $3,400, are 40 years old, and have been in Qatar
for 5 to 6 years. Moreover, both types of migrants exhibit the same average degree
of altruism as shown by the share (37%) of the endowment that they offered in the
dictator game. The representative migrant in each group comes from a household
of four individuals and owns a home with a cement roof that has 3 bedrooms and
2 bathrooms.10
The two groups of migrants are also similar with respect to their preferences
for spending. In particular, 76% of the migrants with a loan reported that the
loan was taken to ”buy a house, repair/build a house, or buy land” (see Figure
1 that shows migrants’ reasons for existing loans). Similarly, when asked how
the household plans to spend future savings, 73% of the migrants without a loan
reported that they would like to ”buy a house, repair/build a house, or buy land.”
Next, we compare how remittances were spent by households for each of the two
groups of migrants. The migrants were asked to report the expenses, made out
of their remittances, for different spending categories (including savings) during
the last 12 months. A summary of the results is available in Figure 2. Panel A
shows average dollar spendings by expenditure category and loan type, and Panel
10Not surprisingly, we were unable to link any of the background characteristics and degree of
altruism to the likelihood that a migrant will have a loan. Results from the probit specification
are available upon request.
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B shows average corresponding expenditure shares of each group. As expected, we
observe that migrants without loans save more, but they also spend more under
each category both in absolute and relative numbers. However, if we take the post-
repayment remittances and then compare the expenditure shares between the two
groups, then, except for the savings category, we see much similarity among the
migrants irrespective of whether they have a loan obligation or not.11
3. Empirical Model
We now turn to our study of how migrant characteristics, and particularly
altruism, affect remittances. We first investigate how migrants’ background and
household characteristics affect remittances. Consider a standard remittance spec-
ification12 that excludes altruism
lnR = a+Xβ + Zγ + ε. (1)
Above, lnR is the log of the annual remittances; X is a vector of migrants’ back-
ground characteristics (income, age, education, and years employed in Qatar); Z is
a vector of household characteristics (income, total savings and size)13; and ε is a
normally distributed error term. A dummy variable is used to measure educational
attainment, with a value of 1 if the migrant sought post high-school education,
11Arguably, Figure 2 points to a savings commitment problem among the migrants without
loan obligations, as their total savings are less than the sum of savings and loan repayments of
the migrants with a loan obligation. This observation is in line with the study of Bauer et al.
(2012) on microfinance loans in India, where they argue that the microcredit innovation may
also help in fostering self-discipline in financial behavior.
12See Rapoport and Docquier (2006) and references cited therein for common methodologies
of modeling remittance behavior.
13Household savings are the sum of savings in the form of cash, bank and postal accounts,
stocks, ROSCA funds (chitty), life insurance plans, market value of gold, and value of land
holdings.
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and 0, otherwise. The results for the pooled sample and for the No Loan and Have
Loan groups are reported in columns 1, 2, and 3 of Table 3, respectively.
In all three models, migrants’ income is the only statistically significant ex-
planatory variable at conventional levels (p < 0.05). For every dollar earned,
migrants remit home about 60 cents. No other characteristic seems to matter.
However, there appear to be some differences for the two groups, in models 2
and 3. In particular, if we look at economic significance, we observe that for age,
education, and household size the coefficients collapse toward 0 for the group of
migrants with a loan obligation. This hints at the possibility that two different
models are needed to explain the behavior of migrants with and without loans.
Given that apart from a migrant’s income, his background and household char-
acteristics do not seem to explain remittance behavior, we proceed to investigate
whether a direct measure of altruism provides any explanatory power. Addition-
ally, to motivate our next specification, we provide scatter plots of altruism and
remittances across the two groups of migrants in Figure 3. We observe that for
the migrants who report a monthly loan obligation (left diagram), remittances in-
crease in altruism.14 However, for those without an explicit loan obligation (right
diagram), altruism is uncorrelated with remittances.
Our specification that accounts for altruism is as follows
lnR = a0 + a1 lnY + a2LOAN + a3ALTR + a4ALTR ∗ LOAN + ε, (2)
where lnY is the log of the annual income of a migrant; LOAN is a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if a migrant reports a monthly loan obligation
and 0, otherwise; and ALTR, a proxy of altruism, is the share of the endowment
(in decimals) that a migrant offers in the dictator game.
14The scatter plot for the group with loans has an outlier. It has, however, no qualitative effect
and only a marginal quantitative effect on our findings.
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OLS estimates for various models of specification (2) are presented in Table
4. Columns 1–3 report the impact of altruism and of having a loan on remit-
tance behavior for the entire sample. Without an interaction between these two
characteristics – i.e., when considering the entire pool of migrant workers as homo-
geneous – neither having a loan nor being altruistic matters. However, when we
interact loan obligations with altruism, we find that both the loan dummy and the
interaction term matter, as shown in column 4. To check robustness, we included
additional explanatory variables that were originally part of specification (1) in
Table 3. As shown in column 5, the magnitude and statistical significance of the
loan variable and altruism-loan interaction variable do not change.
Several observations can be made based on the empirical results. First of all,
for the entire sample we find no relationship between altruism and remittances.
But we find a positive and statistically significant relationship for the subsample of
migrants with a loan obligation. Using estimates from column 5 of Table 4, for the
migrant with a loan obligation a 10 percentage point increase in the contribution
made in the dictator game translates into about a 3.5 percentage point higher
remittance. Furthermore, a negative coefficient on the dummy variable for loans
indicates non-trivial differences in the amounts remitted across the two groups
depending on the degree of altruism. If a migrant is selfish (0% contribution),
then he remits by 20% less if he has a loan, but if he is of the average degree of
altruism (a contribution of 37%), then he remits by 4% more if he has a loan.
In other words, the remittance schedule in altruism estimated for the group of
migrants with loans crosses the corresponding schedule of the other group from
below.
We also examine whether other variables, such as the ones in vectors X and Z
in specification (1), have any explanatory power when interacted with the LOAN
dummy. This can happen, for example, if the importance of these characteristics
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varies across each group. The results are reported in Table 5. Each column
represents a version of specification (2), in which the variable ALTR is replaced
with a different variable. Aside from migrants’ income, no other explanatory
variable in these regressions is statistically significant at conventional levels.
4. Reference Dependence
The finding that altruism does not explain remittance behavior for the entire
sample is in line with the view that the altruistic motive can be offset by other
motives for remittances or various confounding factors. Our study presents one
such confounding factor. Specifically, possessing a loan obligation influences re-
mittance behavior and, particularly, the extent to which altruism is a factor in
determining remittances. To provide an explanation for this finding, we turn to a
model with reference-dependent preferences. The basic idea underlying this anal-
ysis is that an explicit loan obligation brings more certainty about the reference
point for remittances.
The approach is to extend the standard remittance model (Lucas and Stark
(1985), Stark (1995, Ch. 1)) with reference dependence. Here, we highlight
the main ingredients of our model and introduce it formally in Appendix A. In
the model, a migrant worker derives utility from own consumption and from his
ability to remit enough to meet a reference point for remittances. Specifically, he
experiences a psychological cost or gain if his remittance is below or, respectively,
above a reference point, with losses looming larger than gains. The intensity of
the psychological factor is in proportion to the migrant’s degree of altruism. The
reference point is the amount of money that the migrant is expected to send home,
as determined by existing obligations, family needs, social comparisons, or other
contextual circumstances. The reference point can be, however, uncertain, in
which case the degree of uncertainty becomes an important factor for remittance
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decisions (Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)).
Generally, utility theories of reference dependence are motivated by empirical
evidence about the effects of contextual circumstances on the individual percep-
tion of utility. These effects are typically found to take the form of loss aversion
with respect to some reference point, determined by the decision maker’s current
position and expectations, as well as by social norms and comparisons.15 Regard-
ing remittance behavior, similarly to other realms of economic behavior, there are
strong reasons to believe that the subjective utility of remittances depends on
contextual circumstances. Examples of such circumstances could be the history of
remittances, individual or common beliefs about a ”fair” amount of remittances,
recipients’ expectations or family pressures. For instance, according to Gardner
(2012), a study on immigration to the Persian Gulf states, it is often family pres-
sures that are responsible for the decision to emigrate and for the amount of re-
mittances to be sent home. The anthropological study of Osella and Osella (2000)
describes a local status categorization of migrant workers from Kerala, based on
their ability to earn money abroad, and privileges associated with high status.
Returning to our study, we argue that possessing a loan obligation reduces
uncertainty about the reference point for remittances. This assumption can be
motivated in two ways. First, specifically to our study, we observe that the two
types of migrants, distinguished by explicit loan obligations, have otherwise very
similar socioeconomic backgrounds and consumption preferences. In particular,
both types report the same purpose of their loans or savings/remittances. When
asked about the purpose of their loans, 76% of the migrant workers with a loan
obligation report to buy, build, or repair a house. All migrants without a loan list
the same purpose among their top priorities. Thus, to the extent that satisfying
15Recent applications of reference-dependent preferences include Abeler et al. (2011), Craw-
ford and Meng (2011), Pope and Schweitzer (2011).
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this family need is a major influence on the expectation of how much should be
remitted, then the presence of a loan obligation provides greater certainty about
this expectation and the corresponding reference level for remittances. Second,
and more generally, even if not exposed to explicit loan obligations, migrants are
frequently bound by implicit family loan contracts, typically made to finance mi-
gration costs (for the relevance of such implicit loan contracts, see Poirine (1997)).
Remittances are then considered as dividends from the family investment, but ex-
plicit financial requirements – which can include a loan obligation – create greater
certainty about the exact size of expected dividends for which a migrant is respon-
sible.
Then, assuming that migrants without a loan obligation face more uncertainty
about the reference point is sufficient for the model to produce predictions that
match our empirical findings. If a migrant remits a small amount, then because
of uncertainty there is a risk that the amount remitted falls short of the reference
point. An increase in uncertainty also increases this risk, which prompts a loss-
averse migrant to remit more as a hedging measure against the increased risk. This
explains the negative coefficient of the dummy variable for loans in our empirical
results or rather why selfish migrants without loans remit more. Conversely, if a
migrant remits a large amount, then the risk of falling short of the reference point is
negligible even with an increased degree of uncertainty. Because of the diminishing
marginal utility from remittances above the reference point and a low level of
private consumption, an increase in uncertainty prompts a migrant to choose more
private consumption and, as a result, to lower remittances. This explains our
empirical finding that a migrant with sufficiently high degree of altruism and,
thus, a high level of remittance remits more if he has a loan obligation, i.e., is
more certain about the reference point. To put it differently, our model predicts
a flatter remittance schedule in altruism for migrants without loan obligations in
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accordance with our empirical results. Figure 4 illustrates the predictions of our
model.
5. Conclusion
We study the relationship between altruism and financial remittances of mi-
grants. We find that, overall, there is little evidence of a universal relationship
between altruism and remittances. However, we do find that altruism can have a
significant effect on remitting behavior for some migrants. This effect depends on
accounting for a confounding factor—the possession of loan obligations. In partic-
ular, remittances rise in altruism only for migrants with explicit loan obligations.
To account for this pattern of findings, we postulate that for the migrants
without loan obligations the importance of the altruistic motive is diminished
by uncertainty and loss aversion. Namely, migrants without loan obligations are
less certain about the expectations for remittances held at home than those with
explicit loan obligations. As a result, when the risk of falling short of these expec-
tations is significant, the former have to remit more in order to hedge themselves
against the increased risk, and vice versa. Ultimately, these effects make them less
responsive to any altruistic motive.
In parallel to the literature on reference-dependent preferences, the current
study points to the importance of contextual circumstances for remitting behavior.
As in other realms of economic behavior, in migration such circumstances can play
an important role for the formation of reference points with subsequent effects on
decisions. In our study, the contextual circumstance is the existence of an explicit
loan obligation. As a consequence, two seemingly indistinguishable groups can
exhibit very different behavior, based on different contextual circumstances and the
effects that these have on reference levels. Funkhouser (1995) documents a striking
and puzzling difference in migrants’ remittances sent to El Salvador and Nicaragua
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regardless of very similar country and migrant characteristics, which could possibly
be another incidence of reference dependence and contextual circumstances.
More research on the importance of reference dependence and contextual fac-
tors for remittance behavior is needed. For instance, the remittance model with
reference-dependent preferences could also yield novel predictions on the effects
of networks in explaining remittance behavior. As a migrant worker spends a
substantial amount of time interacting with his peers, the remittance behavior
of his peers, who most often come from the same community back home, may
potentially influence expectations and reference levels and, through these, may
also influence the migrant’s remittance behavior. That is, peers’ remittances may
serve as a reference point. Thus, in addition to accounting for migrant and house-
hold characteristics, understanding the formation of migrant networks may also
be important in explaining remittance behavior.
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Appendix A. Model
The model presented below offers an explanation why the remittance equation
for the group of migrants with explicit loan obligations can have a lower inter-
cept but a higher coefficient of altruism. The model is a variation of the standard
remittance model of Lucas and Stark (1985) refined with reference-dependent pref-
erences.
Consider a migrant worker who has to divide his earned income Y > 0 between
remittance R ≥ 0 sent to his family and private consumption, Y − R ≥ 0. The
migrant’s utility from private consumption is given by function u(.) that satisfies
u′(.) > 0, u′′(.) < 0, and the Inada conditions limx→Y u′(x) = 0 and limx→0 u′(x) =
∞. The family’s welfare from remittance R is given by function µ(R−R), where
R is a reference point for remittances. We assume that µ(.) satisfies the properties
of a “universal gain-loss function” in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). Specifically, the
migrant experiences a negative utility from remittance if R < R and a positive
utility if R > R, where utility losses resonate more than gains. The reference point
R is uncertain and, for analytical convenience, assumed to be uniformly distributed
over an interval [r− e, r+ e]. The parameter e, 0 < e < r, measures the migrant’s
uncertainty about the reference point.
Letting α > 0 denote the migrant’s degree of altruism, measured as the weight
the migrant puts on the family’s welfare, we write the migrant’s total utility as






The optimal remittance level, R∗ = arg maxR U(R;Y, e), is determined by the
first-order condition




µ′(R∗ −R)dR = 0. (A.2)
By the fundamental theorem of calculus and algebraic transformations, we get
−2eu′(Y −R∗) + α (µ(R∗ − r + e)− µ(R∗ − r − e)) = 0. (A.3)
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We assume the existence of an interior solution, i.e., that the second-order condi-
tion (SOC) is satisfied (given the concavity of u(.) and the properties of µ(.), this
condition might not hold only under very specific circumstances). From (A.3),
we can establish that remittances increase in altruism, i.e., the internal derivative
dR∗/dα > 0.
Now suppose that the migrant becomes less certain about the reference point
R, which we model by an increase in e. The effect of increased uncertainty on




2u′(Y −R∗)− α (µ′(R∗ − r + e) + µ′(R∗ − r − e))
SOC
. (A.4)
The denominator of (A.4) is negative, but the numerator can be both positive
and negative. In particular, it depends on the size of R∗. For small values of R∗,
the first term, 2u′(Y −R∗), is small as the level of private consumption Y −R∗ is
large. But, due to loss aversion, the second term can be large and dominate the first
term, yielding dR∗/de > 0. Conversely, for high values of R∗ the marginal utility
of private consumption turns large, whereas the effect of loss aversion weakens,
resulting in the negative sign of dR∗/de.










For small values of e, the numerator can be approximated as
2µ′(R∗ − r)− (µ′(R∗ − r + e) + µ′(R∗ − r − e)) . (A.6)
For small values of R∗ so that R∗ − r− e < 0, the term in brackets dominates the
first term as µ′(R∗−r−e) becomes large due to loss aversion, yielding dR∗/de > 0.
The migrant increases the amount remitted to diminish the risk of falling short of
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the reference point. For large values of R∗ so that R∗ − r − e > 0, the expression
in (A.6) can be positive, yielding dR∗/de < 0. A sufficient condition for this
is µ′′′(x) < 0 for x > 0. In words, with the diminishing impact of remittances
once they are above the reference point, an increase in uncertainty results in a
smaller amount remitted because the utility from overshooting the reference point
(captured by µ′(R∗ − r + e)) is smaller than the utility from increased private
consumption.
All in all, our model predicts a flatter remittance schedule in altruism for
migrants that are less certain about remittance expectations. As argued in the
main text, the case of explicit loan obligations can be related to a greater degree
of certainty about the reference point for remittances. Then, the predictions of
our model match the empirical patterns obtained.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics (%) for Sample Background (N=105)
Age Occupation
20-29 6 Carpenter 27
30-39 42 Driver 22
40-49 40 Electrician 12
50-59 12 Other 12
Plumber 7
Religion Construction laborer 6
Hindu 77 Mechanic 6
Christian 21 Plant operator 6
Muslim 2 Painter 3
Education Household Members (excl. migrant)
Upper Primary school 1 One 1
Some High school 28 Two 4
High school completed 61 Three 46
Some Pre-Degree 6 Four 27
Certification/Diploma 3 Five 18
Undergraduate degree 1 Six 4
Years in Qatar Income (monthly, Qatari Riyal)
< 1 year 26 < 1,000 4
< 2 years 13 < 2,000 51
< 3 years 11 < 3,000 37
< 4 years 6 < 4,000 6
< 5 years 8 4,000+ 3
< 6 years 11
6+ 24 Bank Account in Qatar
Yes 24
Expected Time in Qatar No 76
< 1 year 3
< 2 years 2 Have Monthly Loans
< 3 years 25 Yes 44
< 4 years 6 No 56
< 5 years 5




Table 2 - Summary Statistics by Loan Group
Group All No loan Loan Difference 
(1) (2) (3) (2) - (4)
Annual income (in US $) 6'456 6'657 6'199 458 0.39
Annual remittances (in US $) 3'387 3'414 3'353 61 0.81
Age 40.24 40.49 39.91 0.58 0.70
Completed some post high-school education 10% 12% 7% 5% 0.36
Years in Qatar 5.29 5.69 4.76 0.93 0.41
Altruism (% of endowment offered) 37% 37% 37% 0% 0.92
Annual income (in US$) 327 449 169 280 0.07
Savings (in US $)* 28'665 26'170 31'866 -5'696 0.24
Size (excluding the migrant) 3.70 3.81 3.54 0.27 0.16
(iii) Type of Residence
Own home 99% 98% 100% -2% 0.38
Number of bedrooms 3.02 3.00 3.04 -0.04 0.72
Number of bathrooms 1.77 1.78 1.76 0.02 0.85
Home has cement roof 90% 89% 92% -3% 0.68
Renovating or building a new home 2% 2% 2% 0% 0.86
Own motor car 5% 5% 4% 1% 0.86
Own motor cycle/scooter 14% 15% 13% 2% 0.75
Own Telephone (landline) 62% 71% 50% 21% 0.03
Own flat panel TV 35% 36% 35% 1% 0.93
Own DVD/MP3 player 90% 90% 91% -1% 0.80
Own refrigerator 70% 71% 67% 4% 0.68
Own computer 6% 5% 7% -1% 0.76
Number of Observations 105 59 46
(i) Migrant Characteristics
(ii) Household Characteristics
(iv) Other household assets
*Household savings refer to the value of land (83%), gold (11%), life insurance plan (4%), chitty (1%) and 
other (1%).
T-test   
p-value
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Table 3 - Regression: Remittances, Income, and Background Characteristics
Groups All No loan Have loan
(1) (2) (3)
Migrant's income (ln) 0.595*** 0.532*** 0.668***
(0.0711) (0.105) (0.0744)
Migrant's age (ln) 0.149 0.391* -0.0213
(0.120) (0.221) (0.147)
Migrant's education (post-high school dummy) 0.110 0.128 0.0483
(0.0945) (0.0943) (0.198)
Years employed in Qatar (ln) -0.0287 -0.0120 -0.0274
(0.0330) (0.0460) (0.0374)
Household size (ln) 0.0506 0.247 -0.00105
(0.0790) (0.166) (0.103)
Household's annual income (ln) 0.375 0.498 0.342
(0.364) (0.508) (0.280)
Household's  savings (ln) 0.0233 -0.0217 0.0522*
(0.0266) (0.0397) (0.0274)
Constant 0.861 -0.0515 0.717
(2.652) (3.655) (2.411)
R-squared 0.560 0.472 0.773
Observations 105 59 46
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All specifications include a dummy variable for households with no income in India. 
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Table 4 - Regression Results: Remittances, Income and Altruism
Version (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln Y 0.623*** 0.617*** 0.624*** 0.614*** 0.589***
(0.0816) (0.0765) (0.0749) (0.0688) (0.0593)
LOAN 0.0357 0.0359 -0.232** -0.232**
(0.0382) (0.0393) (0.0942) (0.103)
ALTR -0.00449 -0.00887 -0.349 -0.405
(0.141) (0.142) (0.237) (0.248)
ALTR*LOAN 0.727** 0.753***
(0.283) (0.278)
Constant 4.139*** 4.235*** 4.128*** 4.383*** 1.009
(1.023) (0.980) (0.957) (0.896) (2.708)
Other Controls NO NO NO NO YES
R-squared 0.523 0.520 105 0.569 0.614
Observations 105 105 0.523 105 105
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The set of controls are migrant's age (ln), having a post-high school qualification, 
years in Qatar (ln), household size (ln), household's annual income (ln), 
household's savings (ln) and a dummy for households without reported income in 
India.
In column 5, the sum of the coefficients on altruism and its interaction with the 
loan indicator is 0.349 with a standard error of 0.129, t-value of 2.69 and highly 
significant at conventional levels (p=0.008).
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Table 5 - Regression: Remittances, Income, and Background Characteristics. Additional Specifications
Version (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
X = Migrant X = Migrant X = Migrant X=Household X = Household X = Household
Age Education Years in Qatar Income Savings Size
lnY 0.615*** 0.598*** 0.622*** 0.620*** 0.621*** 0.628***
(0.0810) (0.0831) (0.0775) (0.0789) (0.0799) (0.0791)
Have_Loan 0.625 0.0408 0.0724 0.0198 -0.479 0.177
(0.647) (0.0380) (0.0630) (0.0350) (0.532) (0.238)
lnX 0.115 0.103 0.00470 -0.00151 0.00368 0.0877
(0.140) (0.0921) (0.0440) (0.0155) (0.0464) (0.144)
lnX*Have_Loan -0.160 -0.0301 -0.0317 0.0216 0.0513 -0.109
(0.177) (0.197) (0.0515) (0.0176) (0.0525) (0.174)
Constant 3.814*** 4.442*** 4.144*** 4.179*** 4.125*** 3.964***
(1.190) (1.038) (0.999) (1.002) (0.998) (0.985)
Other Controls NO NO NO NO NO NO
R-squared 0.526 0.531 0.526 0.532 0.536 0.526
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105
The dependent variable is the log of remittances, lnR. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1 - Reason for Existing Loans
The figure above shows the reasons why 46 migrants in our sample took out a loan. Each 
row represents the percentage of these migrants that chose that answer as the reason 
for the loan.  Property Related  adds up the "Build a house" (30 individuals), "Buy a 
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Figure 2 - Most Important Uses of Remittances over the Last Year by Loan-Type Group
Panel A: Average spending by category (in US $) Panel B: Percentage of expenditure by category










































































Figure 3 - Scatter Plot of Altruism and Remittances for Migrants With and Without Loans 
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Figure 4 – Predicted Remittance Schedules in Altruism 
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